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Book Reviews 
HOW MANY SPOUSES DOES THE 
CONSTITUTION ALLOW ONE TO HAVE? 
THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA. By Sarah Barringer Gordon.1 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 2002. Pp. XIV, 
337. $49.95 (hard); $19.95 (paper). 
David R. Dow2 and Jose I. Maldonado, Jr. 3 
"By convention, and perhaps out of psychological need, we too 
often interpret the bizarre facts of our universe as mere farce, 
beneath belief "4 
Thomas Green will never be mistaken for Martin Luther 
King, Jr. He has sparked no national movement. Historians will 
not write books about him. It is even doubtfal that very many 
people will remember his name a century hence. Like King, 
however, he is someone who has lived his life in a manner dic-
tated by his moral code; like King, he did so despite the risk that 
living in accordance with his values would lead him to prison. 
Thomas Green is in fact in prison, sentenced to a term of five 
years. Waiting for him to be freed are his five wives and twenty-
nine children. Green is a polygamist. He is one of some 30,000 
people living in Utah who, calling themselves Mormons, live in 
I. Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania. 
2. Distinguished University Professor, University of Houston Law Center. I thank 
Brian Bix for extensive comments on a previous draft, Katya Glockner-Dow for lengthy 
discussions of the thesis, and the University of Houston Law Foundation for financial 
support. I am grateful to Professor Mary Anne Case for lengthy discussions concerning 
ostensible administrative rationales for laws prohibiting polygamy. 
3. J.D., University of Houston Law Center, 2003. 
4. TIM O'BRIEN, JULY, JULY 90 (2002). 
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polygamous families. He was sentenced in August 2002 for vio-
lating Utah's anti-polygamy statute. 
For most Americans, polygamy is a bizarre fact. What type 
of man would want such a family, and what type of woman 
would agree to such a relationship? Polygamy is a bizarre fact 
because the lifestyle is abhorrent to some and unfathomable to 
most. But the fact that something is different does not mean that 
it warrants vilification. Obviously, not all eccentricity is valuable, 
but neither is all eccentricity malignant. For reasons rooted in 
the First Amendment as well as the due process clause, Ameri-
cans remain indifferent to most eccentricities. Increasingly, un-
conventional lifestyles are common, uncontroversial, and ac-
cepted by mainstream culture. Arrangements that once turned 
heads-married couples that elect not to have children, unmar-
ried couples that together do have children, interracial and 
same-sex civil unions- are now unremarkable. Polygamy, how-
ever, is an exception. It is a form of domesticity that is not ac-
cepted, a mode of living that the government has criminalized. 
Polygamy is a form of eccentricity that has been singled out for 
eradication in America-singled out a century ago, and singled 
out again today. 
Polygamy strikes many people as somewhere between ab-
horrent and laughable. But if it does not cause loud and acrimo-
nious debate any longer, it is perhaps because so few Americans 
practice it, and because few are aware of it. Indeed, to the extent 
people are aware of polygamy at all, they treat it as a perverse 
curiosity, not a problem of national import. Polygamy is irrele-
vant, because it is rare. It is not nonexistent, however, and be-
cause it is not, the constitutionality of measures that purport to 
criminalize it merit attention. 
Sarah Barringer Gordon's book, The Mormon Question,5 is 
not about contemporary polygamy; it instead addresses the fed-
eral effort to exterminate the practice. The success of the federal 
effort is one reason for polygamy's current rarity: In the nine-
teenth century, Congress, the Executive, and the judicial branch, 
successfully attacked it. No one can know whether polygamy 
would have thrived in the American West had it not been largely 
eradicated by the federal government, but Gordon, as an histo-
rian, shows carefully and dispassionately how the federal gov-
ernment conducted its campaign. 
5. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFL!Cf IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (2002). 
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Gordon's book is a volume of history, not an ideological or 
argumentative tome, but the history she delineates exposes the 
outline of a constitutional argument. In her historical narrative 
lurks a simple constitutional proposition: Laws prohibiting po-
lygamy rest on tenuous constitutional ground. 
The structure of this Review is as follows. In Part I, we sum-
marize Gordon's conclusions and review her examination of the 
practice of polygamy as well as the origin of the federal govern-
ment's efforts to eradicate it. In Part II we initially discuss the 
concept of authority in establishment clause and free exercise ju-
risprudence. Our objective is to develop an approach to estab-
lishment and free exercise issues that focuses on the authority 
that underlies the legislation that is the subject of constitutional 
challenge. Then, using data that Gordon has presented (as well 
as some that she has not), we argue that under the approach to 
the religion clauses that we have delineated, the effort to rid 
Utah of polygamy violates the essential value of the establish-
ment clause. 
I. THE CHRISTIAN CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST POLYGAMY 
In The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional 
Conflict in Nineteenth Century America, Professor Sarah Bar-
ringer Gordon traces the historical development, socially and le-
gally, of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (better 
known as the Mormon Church) from its inception and founda-
tion by Joseph Smith in 1830, to its adoption and eventual re-
nunciation of the so-called Principle: the practice of polygamy. 
As Gordon observes, the Mormon religion began without the 
practice of polygamy. Founded in 1830 by the Church's first 
president, Joseph Smith, the Church of Latter Day Saints (LDS) 
began because it satisfied the spiritual yearnings of an identifi-
able community (p. 19). Indeed, the expressed desire of the early 
Mormons is reminiscent of contemporary critics of American 
culture.6 The LDS Church preached commitment to morals, val-
6. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996); WILLIAM J. BENNETI, THE DEATH OF 
OUTRAGE (1998); see also Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("Our society prohibits ... certain activities not because they harm others 
but because they are considered ... immoral. In American society, such prohibitions 
have included, for example, sadomasochism ... suicide, drug use, prostitution, and sod-
omy."). For a superb critique of the thesis exemplified in the Bork book, see Richard 
Delgado, Rodrigo's Bookbag, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1929 (1998). 
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ues, and sanctity in a nation that the early Mormons perceived as 
corrupt, greedy, and selfish (p. 19). 
According to Mormon tradition, Joseph Smith was a Moses-
like figure, but instead of receiving ten commandments at Sinai, 
Smith received the "golden plates," through which developed 
the cornerstone of the Mormon faith (p. 19). Central beliefs of 
the Mormon faith include the notion that God is a physical be-
ing, who began as a human and became a god through "celestial 
living"; that Jesus was not immaculately conceived; and that the 
site of salvation would be North America, because that is where 
the true believers, or Saints, gathered (p. 21). Above all, Mor-
mons believe that following God's laws-even if these laws are 
contrary to the laws of civil society-will elevate a person into 
eventual godhood (p. 22). 
When, in 1843, Smith purportedly received the "Revelation 
on Celestial Marriage," the LDS Church for the first time offi-
cially endorsed polygamy (p. 22). Initially, only the truly faithful, 
which meant only the highest-ranking church officials, were al-
lowed to practice polygamy (p. 27). Polygamy was regarded as a 
serious responsibility, one that only those sufficiently committed 
and disciplined would be able to undertake; "ordinary" men did 
not possess the character to manage more than one wife (p. 27). 
In the LDS faith, the ability to take more than one wife showed 
true commitment to the faith, and the polygamous lifestyle was 
accordingly regarded as congruous with sanctity (p. 22). 
In a formal sense, a woman's consent to polygamous mar-
riage was required. By living in such a relationship, women re-
ceived the opportunity to live a holy life. Yet it should also be 
noted that, although women had the power to refuse to enter 
such marriages, LDS doctrine held that were they to so refuse, 
they would be forever damned for the selfish act of depriving 
their husbands of true faith (p. 22). 
Polygamy therefore established itself in the LDS commu-
nity, and reports of polygamous relationships quickly spread be-
yond Mormon communities. As stories of this unorthodox life-
style reached non-Mormons in Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio, 
persecution soon followed, both verbal and physical. Most dra-
matically, after Joseph Smith was arrested and imprisoned for 
ordering the destruction of printing presses that had been used 
to criticize his policies, a mob raided the prison where he was 
housed and murdered him (pp. 23-25). Mormons realized that 
the state would not protect them, if it even could, and they began 
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their westward trek under the leadership of Brigham Young (pp. 
25-26). 
In what would become the Utah territory, Mormons settled 
and thrived, with Brigham Young himself presiding as the first 
governor of the Territory (pp. 26-27). The tranquility ended in 
1852, when Orson Pratt announced the Principle to the nation. 
The reaction was furious. Opponents of polygamy compared the 
relationship to slavery (p. 55), the great moral issue of the time, 
insisting that women were coerced into such marriages, just as 
slaves were coerced into bondage; they characterized polyga-
mous culture as violent, promiscuous, and exploitative (pp. 27-
35). In turn, animosity toward polygamy reinvented itself as hos-
tility toward the LDS Church (p. 57). Opponents of polygamy 
outside of Utah correctly perceived that the secular and religious 
authorities were entangled in the Utah Territory, and they in-
sisted that the church be separated from the state (e.g., pp. 57, 
63). 
As this animus toward polygamy and the Mormons was de-
veloping, American courts began to draw on Christian doctrine 
as they explicated principles of common law (e.g., pp. 66-75). At 
the same time, Mormons questioned whether common law prin-
ciples were binding, a questioning that intensified as the line be-
tween common law and Protestant principles grew more blurry. 
In turn, this Mormon questioning intensified hostility toward the 
LDS in the states. Professor Gordon paints a picture of a cycle 
which, once begun, was truly endless. 
People outside of Utah worried, in short, that the territory 
was establishing a church, and that the church it was establishing 
endorsed practices that were anathema. This worry was height-
ened precisely because the LDS church was organized and effi-
cient, and largely beyond the control of outside governmental 
influence (p. 77). Members of Congress decided that it was time 
for the federal government to exert some control. 
In 1862, Congress enacted the Morrill Act for the Suppres-
sion of Polygamy. The Act "outlawed bigamy in the territo-
ries; ... annulled the Utah territorial legislature's incorporation 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and prohib-
ited any religious organization from owning real estate valued at 
more than $50,000" (p. 81). Of course, enacting the statute was 
one thing, enforcing it quite another. As it happened, grand ju-
ries in Utah would not indict Mormons for violating the statute, 
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and so, just five years after its enactment, the statute was charac-
terized by a judiciary committee report as a dead letter (p. 83). 
The political tide began to turn when one of the wives of 
Brigham Young, the president and prophet of the Church, filed 
for divorce. In seeking divorce, Eliza Young claimed that polyg-
amy constituted a "systematic torture of women, riven by jeal-
ousies, violence, and deception." (p. 112). She spoke out against 
polygamy in Washington, D.C., in 1874, to an audience that in-
cluded members of Congress as well as President Grant. Shortly 
thereafter, Congress enacted the Poland Act of 1874 (p. 112-13). 
Responsibility for enforcing federal antipolygamy law was taken 
from territorial judges and given to U.S. Marshals. With these 
changes, the Morrill Act finally yielded a conviction. 
The indictment and eventual conviction of George Rey-
nolds for polygamy was contrived as a test case, and it finally 
reached the Supreme Court in 1878.7 George Washington Biddle 
argued for the Church, and he insisted that the Morrill Act was 
unconstitutional because, by seeking to control the laws of mar-
riage, Congress had invaded a domain of sovereignty reserved to 
the states (p. 123). Arguments based on the free exercise ores-
tablishment clauses were largely absent, in large part because the 
Fourteenth Amendment was still relatively new (p. 124). 
In an opinion that teems with hostility toward Mormonism, 
the Court upheld the conviction, and the constitutionality of the 
statute. As Chief Justice Waite explained, "Polygamy has always 
been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, 
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost 
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African peo-
ple. "8 The opinion in Reynolds reads like a nineteenth-century 
version of Bowers v. Hardwick,9 rejecting a lifestyle because the 
individual Justices were repulsed by it, and because they could 
shroud that repulsion with millennia of similar sentiment. Justice 
7. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
8. /d. at 164. 
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Compare id. at 192-94 ("Sodomy was a criminal offense at 
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they rati-
fied the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 
of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States 
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide 
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults .... 
Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted 
in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at 
best, facetious.") (footnotes and citations omitted), with Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165 ("From 
that day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of 
the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society."). 
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Stevens observed in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 10 that the 
Court's hostility to homosexuals, like its hostility a generation 
before to racial minorities, takes the form of "atavistic opin-
ions," the roots of which "have been nourished by sectarian doc-
trine."11 Exactly the same could be said for the Court's opinion 
in Reynolds. The Justices viewed Mormonism as a patriarchic 
despotism, comparable in odiousness to human sacrifice.12 The 
Court was happy to help Congress and the President force the 
LDS to submit to the will of the secular sovereign. Congress has 
the power to eliminate practices that are "subversive of good or-
der,"13 and allowing religious exemptions to permissible laws 
would "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 14 
Under such circumstances, government would continue to exist 
"only in name. "15 
Once the Court had sanctioned federal efforts to deracinate 
polygamy, those very efforts proliferated (pp. 148-49). Notably, 
for example, Congress enacted the Edmunds Act, which crimi-
nalized unlawful cohabitation, even in the absence of formal 
marriage. The statute also excluded from juries individuals who 
believed in polygamy, and it disfranchised all polygamists (pp. 
151-53). The authority of the state to disenfranchise was upheld 
by the Court. 16 Without the power to vote, it was impossible for 
proponents of polygamy to prevail. 
Of course, as long as women refused to testify against their 
"husbands," the federal laws were practically toothless. Conse-
quently, Congress aimed at the female collaborationists with the 
passage in 1887 of the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which imposed 
penalties against women as well as men (pp. 180-81 ). Few 
women were convicted, but the tactic of arresting and indicting 
them generated leverage that was used to compel them to testify 
against their husbands (p. 181 ). 
When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Edmunds-Tucker Act, 17 which had also divested the LDS church 
10. 530 u.s. 640 (2000). 
II. /d. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12. 98 U.S. at 166. 
13. /d. at 164. 
14. /d. at 167. 
15. /d. 
16. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). The authority of the state to rest legisla-
tion on moral disapprobation of polygamy was recently highlighted in Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996), which we discuss below in the conclusion. 
17. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Later-Day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1 (1890). 
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of most of its property (p. 185), the war was over (p. 219). Justice 
Bradley's majority opinion acknowledged that the consequence 
of the federal power was to dissolve the Mormon Church, but he 
found that objective worthy, noting that the LDS endorsement 
of polygamy was "nefarious" and "a return to barbarism."18 (pp. 
214-15). 
Finally, in September 1890, Wilford Woodruff, the last of 
the Mormon presidents to have made the great journey west-
ward with Brigham Young, capitulated. After much prayer, 
Woodruff claimed to have received a communication from God 
that counseled abandoning the legal claim to practice the Princi-
ple; this retreat was necessary in order to ensure the survival of 
the Church (p. 220). 
And indeed, the Church does survive. No longer does the 
official LDS Church endorse polygamy, though practicing po-
lygamists continue to regard themselves as Mormons. Whether 
polygamists are or are not Mormons is a question that seems be-
side the point, for the one thing that is clear is that but for fed-
eral coercion, the official church would not have renounced the 
practice. 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE 
QUESTION OF LEGffiMATE AUTHORITY 
Neutralit¥ is the basic value that animates the Establish-
ment Clause,' but neutrality is a value that is germane in a mul-
titude of constitutional contexts.20 The most useful way for 
thinking about how this value works in the context of religion is 
by focusing on the issue of authority?' 
18. Id. at 49. 
19. See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 563 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 809 (2000); id. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668,687-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see 
also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of 
Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243 (1996); David R. Dow, Toward a Theory 
of the Establishment Clause, 56 UMKC L. REV. 491 (1988). 
20. Most famously, of course, the equal protection context. See, e.g. United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); see also Paul Brest, The 
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1976); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 951 (2002). 
21. I discuss the concept of authority in a preliminary fashion in David R. Dow, The 
End of Religion, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 877, 882-85 (2001) (reviewing RONALD F. 
THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY (1996)). 
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A. AUTHORITY, CONFLICT, AND THE 
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
579 
Conflict between the state and religion increases as religious 
heterogeneity increases. When the legislators and the citizens all 
share the same faith, then conflict between faith and positive law 
will be rare. However, as the number of religions increases, the 
variety of religious observances increases as well, and with this 
increase in the variety of observance is an increased likelihood of 
conflict between religious ritual and secular law. Simply put, the 
more religions there are, the greater the likelihood that some 
law or regulation will interfere with some observance. 
The history of the United States demonstrates the proposi-
tion: When the nation's population was almost entirely Protes-
tant,22 there was no federal or state interference with Protestant 
observance or ritual, probably because legislators were either 
practicing Protestants themselves or were at least familiar with 
Protestant ritual. Indeed, there was no free exercise or estab-
lishment clause challenge levied against federal law until Rey-
nolds, and no challenge levied against a state law until the twen-
tieth century.23 
Today the United States is dramatically more heterogene-
ous from the standpoint of religious affiliation than it was at the 
founding.24 Indeed, as America became increasingly religiously 
diverse, beginning with significant Catholic and Jewish immigra-
tion in the mid-nineteenth century, resistance to Protestant con-
trol of public education began to manifest itself.25 The tension 
between religious groups that emerged in the context of public 
education arose in other contexts as well. Catholics and Jews, for 
example, were not permitted to serve as governor or state legis-
22. At the time of the founding, Catholics constituted less than two percent of the 
American population. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 563 U.S. 639, 720 (2002) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (citing BARRY KOSMIN & SEYMOUR LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER 
Goo 45 (1993)). Jews and other religions represented an even smaller percentage. See 
generally Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 409 (1986); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim 
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875,919 (1986). 
23. The establishment clause was not applied to the states until 1947. See Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The free exercise clause was incorporated several 
years earlier. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
24. See generally SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 731-1039 (1972). 
25. Zelman, 563 U.S. at 720 (citing John C. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political 
History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279,299-300 (2001)); KOSMIN & 
LACHMAN, supra note 22, at 45-46; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE 219 (2002)). 
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lators in New Hampshire in the 1870s, and in the 1930s, pacifists 
were barred from acquiring citizenship.26 Prohibition of alcohol, 
embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, was pursued largely 
by a handful of religious groups.27 Laws that criminalize suicide 
have clearly discernible religious roots.28 And of course, laws 
forcing certain businesses to close on Sunday and prohibiting the 
sale of particular items on Sunday are rooted in the Christian 
observance of Sabbath?9 
Conceptually and historically, it is plain that conflict be-
tween religion and the state arises only after the state is suffi-
ciently heterogeneous religiously. The explanation for this phe-
nomenon does not necessarily have anything to do with hostility 
toward members of one religion by members of another. In-
stead, the explanation is a straightforward matter of organiza-
tional complexity: Until the state is religiously heterogeneous, 
the state itself shares the legislative preferences of the over-
whelmingly dominant religion, so interference with the rituals of 
that religion is unlikely and acts that tend to establish that relig-
ion will be unnoticed. Once there is no overwhelmingly domi-
nant religion, this dynamic undergoes radical upheaval. 
In a religiously diverse state, conflict between the state and 
one or more religious groups can arise for two distinct reasons. 
First, at times, legislators will target a specific religion or reli-
gious practice, because they regard the targeted practice as con-
temptible. This type of targeting is rare,30 and when it does arise, 
it presents an easy constitutional case. The First Amendment 
prohibits the government from persecuting members of a reli-
gious group,31 and laws that target are a form of persecution. De-
spite the fact that there is some confusion as to precisely which 
26. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM at xii (2001). 
27. /d. at 323-34. 
28. See David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 479, 486 n.38 (1990). See generally George P. Smith, All's Well that 
Ends Well, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 285 (1989); see also L.D. Hankoff, Judaic Origins 
of the Suicide Prohibition, in SUICIDE: THEORY AND CLINICAL ASPECTS 20 (L.D. 
Hankoff & Bernice Einsidler eds., 1979). 
29. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Of course, the Court in McGowan 
held that Sunday closing laws had outgrown their religious origins, a conclusion that is 
criticized in Dow, supra note 19, at 500-01. 
30. As Justice O'Connor has observed, "few States would be so naive as to enact a 
law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such." Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872,894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
31. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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constitutional provision such a practice violates,32 there is little 
doubt that it is constitutionally intolerable. 
For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah,33 the Court confronted a municipal ordinance 
that aimed at eliminating a religious ritual engaged in by mem-
bers of the Santeria religion, a sect that fused elements of Ro-
man Catholicism with aspects of the Cuban Yoruba.34 In particu-
lar, members of the Santeria religion continue the ancient 
practice of animal sacrifice.35 Santeria adherents sacrifice ani-
mals to celebrate birth and marriage, to grieve deaths, and to 
ward off sickness. They sacrifice chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, 
guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles by cutting the carotid arter-
ies, in a manner reminiscent of kosher slaughtering.36 In 1987, a 
Santeria church established itself in the city of Hialeah, Florida. 
Months later, the Hialeah city council met in emergency session 
and enacted a law that criminalized animal sacrifice.37 The Su-
preme Court unanimously found the ordinance impermissible. 
As Justice Kennedy's opinion stressed, "a law targeting religious 
beliefs as such is never permissible"; "if the object of a law is to 
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious mo-
tivation, the law is not neutral," and it is therefore unconstitu-
tional.38 The City of Hialeah, of course, did proffer a neutral, 
secular basis for the law: The city argued that the ordinance 
aimed to prohibit animal cruelty.39 But the fit between that as-
serted objective and the means was so imperfect, that the Court 
easily dismissed it as pretextual.40 Just as Justice Harlan "knew" 
that the real purpose of segregated railroad cars in nineteenth 
century Louisiana was to keep blacks out of the white cars, 
rather than vice versa,41 the Justices in Lukumi Babalu all under-
32. The violation can be expressed as an equal protection violation, a free exercise 
violation, or, as we will argue below, as an establishment clause violation. See, e.g., Ken-
neth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69 TUL. 
L. REV. 335 (1994). 
33. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). There were a variety of opinions, however. Justice Ken-
nedy wrote for the Court, but Justices Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist), Souter, 
and Blackmun (joined by Justice O'Connor) wrote separately. Justice Souter in particu-
lar noted that the City's ordinance exhibited "a rare example of a law [that] actually 
aimed at suppressing religious exercise." /d. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring). 
34. 508 U.S. at 524-25. 
35. /d. at 525. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 526-27. 
38. /d. at 533. 
39. /d. at 537. 
40. /d. at 537-39. 
41. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Every one 
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stood that the Hialeah city council was not concerned with ani-
mal welfare at all. 
Conversely, where the state does have a legitimate secular 
purpose that is not serving simply to mask naked hostility toward 
difference, its laws will survive First Amendment scrutiny even if 
they have a uniquely burdensome impact of members of a dis-
crete religion. For example, in Employment Division v. Smith,42 
the Court confronted an Oregon law that prohibited the use of 
peyote. The prohibition fell disproportionately harshly on mem-
bers of the Native American Church, because that church pre-
scribes the sacramental use of peyote. None of the Justices, how-
ever, perceived that the State was aiming at a religious practice. 
Justice Scalia's opinion reasoned that, at least in the absence of 
evidence indicating that the state was using a law as a pretext to 
eradicate a religious sect, the free exercise clause does not create 
an exception to "generally applicable criminal laws. "43 Allowing 
individuals to escape from the consequences of laws that they 
objected to on rel~ious grounds would make each individual "a 
law unto himself" -a phrase that echoed Justice Waite's opin-
ion in Reynolds. Of course, it is nothing short of bizarre that Jus-
tice Scalia chose to cite Reynolds for this proposition, in that the 
anti-polygamy statutes did target a specific religion in a way that 
Oregon's anti-narcotics statute did not, but the basic point-that 
there is not a religious exemption from law on the basis of the 
free exercise clause- is a perfectly sound understanding of that 
constitutional provision.45 
Although it may be quite rare for a government to take aim 
at a particular religious practice, it is not at all uncommon for a 
state law to have some unintended impact on religious obser-
vance. Laws that require citizens to be available to work in order 
to be entitled to unemployment benefits, for example, may pe-
nalize citizens whose inability to gain employment results from 
their religious practices.46 Similarly, Sunday closing laws placed 
knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude 
white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from 
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons."). 
42. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
43. /d. at 884-85. 
44. /d. at 885. 
45. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion took a quite different view, arguing that 
the free exercise clause indeed creates some exemptions for religious citizens from fa-
cially neutral laws. See id. at 891-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
46. In a line of cases commencing with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the 
Court held that citizens could not be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits 
when their refusal to work was a consequence of their religious observance. The Court 
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an economic cost on Jews, Muslims, and Seventh Day Adventists 
that they did not impose on other Christians by requiring mem-
bers of those faiths to close their businesses on the Christian 
Sabbath, though they were already compelled by their faiths to 
close on their own Sabbaths.47 
Conflicts like the one exemplified in the Sunday closing 
cases arise because some laws that have a legitimate secular pur-
pose nonetheless interfere uniquely with one religion (or a small 
number of religions). Laws that require parents to seek medical 
care for their sick children interfere uniquely (or nearly so) with 
Christian Scientists.48 Laws that prohibit consumption of peyote 
interfere uniquely (or nearly so) with certain Native American 
religions.49 
In cases where the state enacts a measure that has a legiti-
mate secular purpose, and that measure happens to interfere 
uniquely (or more substantially) with one or a limited number of 
religions, the Court has, since Employment Division v. Smith,50 
used a rational relation test to evaluate the permissibility of the 
state's enactment. Consequently, if the state has a legitimate 
purpose for the measure's enactment, the measure will survive, 
notwithstanding the impact it has on religious observance. 
Moreover, unless the state is targeting a particular religious prac-
tice for the sake of such targeting, its purpose will be deemed le-
gitimate-meaning that outside of rare instances like those at is-
sue in the Hialeah case, the free exercise clause will nullify very 
little state action. 
The approach embraced in Smith makes sense for two rea-
sons, one practical and one conceptual. The practical reason is 
that were the test anything other than rational relation analysis, 
any individual could challenge any criminal statute, arguing that 
reasoned that the contrary result would violate the free exercise clause. Although this 
line of cases has not been repudiated, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 
480 U.S. 136 (1987), its doctrinal footing is exceedingly tenuous, and the principle has 
been narrowly cabined to the employment context. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1967); Dow, supra note 19, at 505-10. 
47. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961). 
48. See NOONAN & GAFFNEY, supra note 26, at 555-56. 
49. See 0MER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION 327-36 (1987). 
50. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Further, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 
the Court made it clear that Congress lacks the power to compel the Court to evaluate 
free exercise challenges using a compelling state interest test instead of rationality re-
view. Vanous states, however, have substituted a compelling state interest test for the 
rational basis test as a matter of state law. See Gary S. Gildin, Coda to William Penn's 
Overture, 4 U. PA. 1. CONST. L. 81, 124-27 (2001) (collecting state laws). 
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the statute interferes with her religious exercise, and the state 
would then have the burden of showing that the statute was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling end-a burden that is of-
ten difficult for a state to meet.5 Precisely because the variety of 
religions represented in America is so broad, the result of using 
anything other than the rational basis test would be either that 
many state criminal statutes would be deemed facially unconsti-
tutional, or they would be applicable to everyone other than 
people whose religious observance was burdened. Criminal law 
would resemble a patchwork quilt. Put simply, the diversity of 
religions in America makes it untenable, as a practical matter, 
for free exercise challenges to trigger any standard of review 
other than rationality review. 
There is also a conceptual basis for using the rational basis 
test in free exercise cases that has nothing to do with the diver-
sity of religions in America. This conceptual reason is that many 
religious practices may involve moral choices that the state is 
permitted to prohibit. A religion may permit men to engage in 
sexual relationships with thirteen-year-old girls, but the state is 
permitted to prohibit such unions regardless of whether a relig-
ion endorses them. For this reason, the federal government was 
rightly concerned about reports that David Koresh, the leader of 
the Branch Davidian movement, was engaging in sexual rela-
tions with underage girls, even if that practice was permitted by 
the members and the norms of the sect.52 A religion may en-
courage parents not to seek medical attention for their sick chil-
dren, and to rely solely on prayer to accomplish healing, but the 
state is permitted to compel parents to seek medical attention 
for their children, or be subject to imprisonment. For this reason, 
the state is permitted to prosecute Christian Scientist parents 
whose children die or suffer serious injury when medical help is 
withheld from them, even though the reason for withholding the 
medical assistance is rooted in religious belief. 53 
51. It is as true now as it was a generation ago when Professor Gunther pointed it 
out that testing a challenge to a fundamental right with strict scrutiny almost always 
means that the rights claim prevails. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 21 (1972); see 
also Dorf, supra note 20, at 964-65. 
52. At the time of the federal siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, 
Texas, reports emerged that Koresh engaged in sexual activity with young girls. See, e.g., 
Sara Rimer & Sam Howe Verhovek, Growing Up Under Koresh: Cult Children Tell of 
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at A3; Deborah Tedford, For CPS Workers, Cult Still 
Mystery; State Found No Proof of Child Abuse, HOUSTON CHRON., May 10, 1993, at 
A14. 
53. See Wendy Kaminer, Sectual Discrimination, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 11, 2002, at 9 
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State criminal laws often embody moral premises.54 Those 
premises may occasionally be at odds with the practices of reli-
gious groups. Yet characterizing opposition to a state's criminal 
laws as "religious" does not permit the opponent of the laws to 
ignore them. That is one idea that the Court in Reynolds got ex-
actly right. The universe of norms that animate state action may 
not overlap precisely with the universe of norms that define a 
given religion, which means that state action may compel action 
that a religion forbids or prohibit conduct that a religion re-
quires. In such circumstances, the religious citizen is required to 
conform her conduct to the secular law. The Court in Smith, in 
concluding that the rational relation test is appropriate in the 
face of free exercise challenges to neutrally applicable criminal 
laws, recognized this simple point. 
Under the free exercise clause, therefore, if the state has 
targeted a particular practice for reasons not immediately and 
obviously connected to a legitimate state end, then the state's ac-
tion is unconstitutional. Where the state has not singled out a 
particular religious practice but instead enacts a law that has the 
consequence of burdening a religious practice, its action is sub-
ject to rationality review-meaning that it will ordinarily survive 
constitutional challenge. 
B. AUTHORITY, CONFLICT, AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
In theory, establishment of religion can occur in two ways. 
First, a state might "establish" a particular church as the official 
church, and thereby bestow that church with various privileges. 
We are accustomed to thinking of this type of establishment as 
equivalent to a theocracy. In so-called Muslim countries, for ex-
ample, Islam is the official state religion, and we correctly regard 
such countries as inherently undemocratic.55 
(discussing the prosecution in Massachusetts of David and Ginger Twitchell, whose son 
Robyn died after they refused to call a doctor, preferring instead to rely on a faith 
healer). This Christian Scientist paradigm is widely discussed in the literature. See, e.g., 
Daniel Billent, The Prosecution of Christian Scientists: A Needed Protection for Children 
or Insult Added to Injury, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 479 (2000); James G. Dwyer, Spiritual 
Treatment Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147 
(2000); Jacqueline B. Tomasso, Note, Separation of the Conjoined Twins, 54 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 771, 790-91 (2002); Scott E. Williams, Note, Religious Exemptions and the Limits of 
Neutrality, 74 TEX. L. REV. 119 (1995). 
54. Criminal laws, however, nearly always aspire to protect some members of soci-
ety from injury caused by others; the moral premises of these laws are not ordinarily 
"naked" moral preferences, a term we develop below. 
55. A distinction should be drawn between a democratic state that has a state relig-
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But there is a second, more subtle-and more insidious-
form of establishment. It occurs when a particular church (or 
group of churches) is nonofficially privileged or deemed authori-
tative. This form of establishment is more difficult to identify, 
but no less antithetic to democracy. Examples of this form of es-
tablishment are not uncommon. Sunday closing laws are perhaps 
the most egregious illustration. Notwithstanding Chief Justice 
Warren's view that Sunday has become a secular, as well as are-
ligious, day of rest for most Americans, 56 the original impetus 
for these laws was indisputably the religious command that Sun-
day be observed as the Christian Sabbath. The laws therefore 
privileged the Christian Sabbath vis-a-vis the Muslim or Jewish 
Sabbath, and further privileged Sabbath observers vis-a-vis non-
Sabbath observers, regardless of their religiosity. Similarly, the 
prohibition on the use of contraception even by married couples, 
which was struck down by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,57 was enacted by a legislature dominated by Catho-
lics, who opposed for religious reasons the use of contracep-
tion.58 
The reason that legislatures are not permitted to require 
that citizens rest on the Sabbath, or to prohibit citizens from us-
ing contraception, is that the establishment clause forbids legisla-
tures from enacting laws on the basis of wholly sectarian author-
ity. A legislature is not permitted, for example, to say that 
because the Old Testament mandates that fields lie fallow every 
seven years, that farmers are therefore required to let their fields 
lie fallow every seven years. A legislature is not permitted to say 
that because the Koran forbids consumption of pork, that restau-
rants are forbidden from serving pork. It would be possible, of 
course, to locate a secular basis for either of these injunctions. A 
legislature might conclude that a sound environmental policy 
mandates periodic resting of farmland, and a legislature might 
have at one time concluded that public health concerns war-
ranted a prohibition on the sale of pork. The fact that the same 
statute can either be upheld or struck down, depending on facts 
ion (such as England or Ireland} and a sectarian state where religious law is supreme. As 
I have argued elsewhere, the critical difference between religious law and secular law is 
that religious law, insofar as it is deemed to embody the word of God, is not changeable 
through majoritarian politics. See Dow, supra note 21, at 882-88,893-95. 
56. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
57. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
58. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, lust Say No, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 927-31 (1990} 
(discussing the role of the Catholic Church in preventing the repeal of Connecticut's con-
traception statute). 
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unrelated to what the statute does, reveals an important point: A 
law can be unconstitutional not because of what the law does, 
but because of its origin. 59 
Every culture has certain sources that are legitimate author-
ity within that culture. These sources, in turn, often have roots in 
authorities that antedate the culture itself, but that are then ab-
sorbed into the culture. The norm proscribing the abetment of 
suicide has biblical roots, for example, but has (at least ar~ably) 
been absorbed into the realm of secular authority as well. Con-
versely, cultures have certain sources that are not legitimate au-
thority. Rabbis engaged in a debate would not consult Buddhist 
texts, and mullahs sitting as judges would not examine Catholic 
encyclicals. Legal cultures include legitimate authorities, and the 
list of included authorities excludes everything else.61 
It is important not to confuse the concept of a discrete legal 
culture with the concept of norms. For norms are not necessarily 
limited to a particular legal culture. Virtually all legal cultures 
share the norm proscribing murder, for example, although the 
exceptions to this norm vary somewhat. Moreover, the precise 
content of legal norms is dynamic. Nevertheless, it is useful, for 
establishment clause purposes, to recognize that some norms do 
inhere in identifiable legal cultures-which is to say that they are 
embedded in the legal authorities of a specific culture and absent 
from authorities outside that culture. The norm that prohibits 
the consumption of pork inheres in the Muslim and Jewish legal 
cultures; the norm that stresses savin~ all beings from suffering 
inheres in the Buddhist legal culture. 2 The norm that requires 
59. There is an obvious similarity here to the strand of equal protection doctrine 
that holds that impermissible motive can invalidate state action that is not inherently vio-
lative of the Constitution. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disapprov-
ing the suggestion in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), that motive is insufficient 
to establish constitutional violation)); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) 
(holding that at-large voting systems can be deemed unconstitutional if they are main-
tained to dilute minority voting strength). 
60. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
61. In a sense, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence is both an exception to this 
proposition while identifying it as the rule, because the Court majority examines texts 
and norms outside our culture in seeking to ascertain whether the evolving standards of 
decency proscribe capital punishment, whereas the Justices most inclined to defer to 
state court judgments in the death penalty area criticize these inquiries into foreign 
sources of authority. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (not-
ing the policies of foreign governments) with id. at 868-69 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (reject-
ing the pertinence of foreign choices). 
62. It may be problematic to refer to Buddhism as a legal culture; I do so with some 
reluctance, though the usage seems to me warranted. See HYON GAK SUNIM, ONLY 
DON'T KNOW: SELECTED TEACHING LETTERS OF ZEN MASTER SEUNG SAHN (1999). 
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the state to provide its citizens with equal protection resides in 
the American legal culture. 
Diagramatically, the relationship between laws and norms 
can be represented as follows: 
---+Case (U,) -.(Case (U,)---. etc. 
In the diagram, the box with the large "C" in the middle 
represents the Constitution; it may also be thought of as repre-
senting any discrete constitutional provision (such as the first 
amendment, or the free exercise or establishment clause). Some 
aspects of the Constitution are historically unique (which is to 
say revolutionary);63 however, most of the norms embodied in 
the Constitution have historical precursors. The norms that lie at 
the foundation of our form of government exist, in one iteration 
or another, in most all democratic cultures. To the left of the "C" 
the diagram reflects three major sources of constitutional values. 
The box with the "B" represents the Bible;64 the box with the 
"C/L" represents the common law;65 the box with the "E" repre-
63. The very concept of divided sovereignty is perhaps the most revolutionary fea-
ture. See David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say, 76 IOWA L. REV. 
1, 56-61 (1990). 
64. See, e.g., Patrick M. O'Neil, Bible in American Constitution, in RELIGION AND 
AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 29 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000); Edward McGlynn 
Gaffney, Jr., The Interaction of Biblical Religion and American Constitutional Law, in 
THE BIBLE IN AMERICAN LAW, POLITICS, AND POLITICAL RHETORIC 89 (James Turner 
Johnson ed., 1985); Andrew C. Skinner, The Influence of the Hebrew Bible on the Foun-
ders of the American Republic, in SACRED TEXT, SECULAR TIMES: THE HEBREW BIBLE 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 13 (Leonard Jay Greenspoon & Bryan F. LeBeau eds., 2000); 
Bernard Meislin, The Role of the Ten Commandments in American Judicial Decisions, in 
JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES III187 (A.M. Fussed., 1987). 
65. The list of examples of this influence is close to endless, but representative areas 
would include United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (discussing common law for 
purposes of understanding double-jeopardy clause); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 210-15 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the common law roots of standing and mootness). See generally Michael W. McConnell, 
Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 173; Tho-
mas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revo-
lutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER 
LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955). 
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sents the Enlightenment.66 The diagram is not intended to imply 
that the Constitution absorbs the norms wholesale from these 
other cultures, nor is it intended to imply that constitutional val-
ues have been influenced solely by the other cultures that I have 
identified. Rather, the diagram simply means to reflect the obvi-
ous point that the framers were influenced by these (as well as 
other) intellectual strands. That this point is obvious, however, 
does not diminish from its significance. Indeed, the significance 
of acknowledging and understanding this dynamic is that it indi-
cates that it is appropriate, when seeking to understand constitu-
tional language, to understand the relevant roots of constitu-
tional norms in antecedent cultures. In seeking to understand the 
meaning of religious liberty, for example, it is illuminating 
(which is not to say determinative) to understand the idea of re-
ligious liberty in those antecedent legal systems that help make 
up our own legal and cultural bedrock.67 
The right side of the "C" reflects the process of interpreta-
tion. A case arises. A case is essentially a dispute where the par-
ties disagree on either the relevant principle that should be used 
to resolve the dispute, or on the correct application of a principle 
(or both). They therefore submit their dispute to a person or in-
stitution that is acknowledged to be an authoritative interpreter. 
(One way in which cultures differ is in whom or what they regard 
as authoritative interpreters.)68 In resolving the dispute-i.e., in 
deciding the case-the authoritative interpreter (i.e., the judge in 
our culture) looks back to the Constitution to locate the applica-
ble norm, the norm that is germane to resolving the dispute. In 
applying the norm to the facts of the case, the judge generates an 
understanding (U1), or interpretation, of that norm. The inter-
pretation also has an effect on the content of the norm itself; in 
applying the norm, in other words, the norm is moderately al-
tered. Put differently, the process of implementing the norm si-
66. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on 
American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1992). 
67. The idea of cultural bedrock is discussed in Dow, supra note 65, at 11-29. 
68. It may well be possible to define a culture strictly in terms of a set of legal 
norms. Dow, supra note 21, at 882-84, 893-94; David R. Dow, On Reading Stephen 
Carter's The Culture of Disbelief-A Dissenting Opinion, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 417, 436-
439 (1995). The rise of the nation-state in European history, where the state has roots in 
uniform language and traditions, seems consistent with this suggestion. See, e.g., Martin 
Bernal, Race, Class, and Gender in the Formation of the Aryan Model of Greek Origins, 
in NATIONS, IDENTITIES, CULTURES 7-28 (V.Y. Mudimbe ed.,1997). 
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multaneously shapes the norm.69 In the next case, the judge will 
look back to the Constitution, the locus of the norm, but will also 
examine U1 to better understand how the contemporary legal 
culture has understood the pertinent norm. This interpretation, 
as well, affects the content of the norm itself. This process con-
tinues indefinitely, for as long as the legal culture survives. 
For purposes of our discussion of the religion clauses, this 
diagram illustrates two salient features of any legal culture: (i) a 
legal culture has authoritative texts, and (ii) those authoritative 
texts in turn have antecedents in other texts, which themselves 
reside in different legal cultures. The role of a culture's official 
interpreters is to resolve disputes on the basis of that culture's 
authoritative texts, and the role of a culture's legislators is to leg-
islate on the basis of norms embodied in that culture's authorita-
tive texts. As our diagram indicates, our culture's resolvers of 
disputes-judges-look to our culture's authoritative texts when 
applying and interpreting the law. The authoritative text is the 
Constitution. The Constitution has antecedents, but they lose 
their authority at the moment that C emerges. When judges ex-
amine the Constitution, they are certainly aware of its antece-
dents, and they may well examine those antecedents to better 
their understanding of this culture's authoritative texts, but they 
must also be aware that those antecedent texts do not have any 
independent authority in our legal culture. It would be as wrong 
for a judge in our legal culture to rest a ruling on the Bible as it 
would be for the Pope to rest a ruling on the Koran. 
Similarly, it would be inappropriate for Congress to man-
date that restaurants not serve pork, because the prohibition on 
the consumption of pork is not present in any authority that 
forms a legitimate basis for legislation (principally Article I); 
that is, the prohibition on the consumption of pork is not part of 
recognized authority in American legal culture. In contrast, the 
prohibition against murder is part of the fabric of American legal 
culture, notwithstanding its origins, and notwithstanding that the 
same norm may also be present in certain religious legal cul-
tures.70 
69. Our understanding of the relationship between adjudication (whether formal or 
informal) and the evolution of norms has been enriched by MARK TUNICK, PRACfiCES 
AND PRINCIPLES 34-40 (1998) (discussing Hegel's notion of social practice); and RoY A. 
RAPOPORT, RITUAL AND RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF HUMANITY 124-34, 190-96, 453-
61 (1999). 
70. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court, in upholding the Hyde 
Amendment, observed that the fact that certain ethical principles are present in the 
Judea-Christian tradition does not necessarily entail that they are not also part of the 
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The philosophical premise of our argument seems uncon-
troversial; indeed, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Law-
rence v. Texas 71 illustrates that the Court appreciates the distinc-
tion between a norm rooted in religious bedrock and one that is 
~art of the secular culture. In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick 
2and holding that the constitutional right to privacy encom-
passes consensual homosexual conduct, Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion recognized that the Bowers Court had in effect recognized as 
authoritative a religiously rooted norm.73 As the Court in Law-
rence apprehended, the Bowers Court correctly ascertained the 
content of certain religious norms; its mistake was in concluding 
that those same norms resided independently in American cul-
tural bedrock.74 
It is possible to make certain general observations concern-
ing the norms that reside in sources of authority that provide a 
legitimate basis for legislation and adjudication in America.75 
Most generally, the state and federal legislatures have an interest 
in providing for the health and safety of their citizens, 76 but no 
interest in making them "holy." The state's interest is limited to 
the here-and-now, so to speak, as distinguished from the hereaf-
ter. Accordingly, coercive measures enacted by the government 
must satisfy this general interest. Viewed from this perspective, 
very few laws are inherently problematical. Even Sunday closing 
laws are not necessarily unconstitutional, because the state may 
well have legitimate reasons for wanting citizens not to be seven-
day-a-week workaholics. Consequently, establishment clause 
broader secular culture. See id. at 319. 
71. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
72. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
73. See 123 S. Ct. at 2479-80. 
74. See also 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (endorsing Justice Stevens's view in Bowers, 478 U.S. 
at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting), which concluded that even a moral view endorsed by a 
secular majority cannot be enforced if it is at odds with a constitutional value that is part 
of the "American heritage of freedom."). This view seems extremely close to what we 
refer to below as the strong form of our thesis. 
75. More generally, a recent examination of constitutional norms that is consistent 
with the analysis presented here can be found in Robert P. George, Natural Law, the 
Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269 
(2001). 
76. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 
(1978) (noting that where State "reasonably conclude[s] that 'the health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of 
land," compensation need not accompany prohibition). See generally Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-835 (1987) ("Our cases have not elaborated on the 
standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest[.]' [but] [t]hey have 
made clear ... that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these 
requirements."). 
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suspicions may be triggered by the content of a law, but often 
the establishment clause violation will depend on an assessment 
of the state's objective in enacting the law, which is perforce an 
inquiry into legislative purpose.77 
The salience of legislative motive in establishment clause 
analysis has been recognized for many years. The Lemon test,78 
by examining both the purpose as well as the effect of enact-
ments challenged as violating the establishment clause, acknowl-
edges that states can violate the clause both by what they do and 
by why they do it. Motive matters, because the fundamental es-
tablishment clause value is neutrality, and the requirement of 
neutrality can be violated by both actions as well as motivations. 
The neutrality norm of the establishment clause has two 
dimensions: First, it requires that the government be neutral as 
among religions (for example, it cannot prefer Christians to 
Jews, Protestants to Catholics, Muslims to Hindus, and so on); 
second, it requires that the government be neutral as between 
religion and nonreligion (for example, it cannot prefer church-
goers to atheists). Actions that target a specific religious practice 
are thus coherently analyzed as establishment clause cases, be-
cause they exhibit non-neutrality between the targeted and non-
targeted religions. The neutrality norm of the establishment 
clause therefore explains why criminal laws that target a particu-
lar religious practice are unconstitutional: because the govern-
ment has disfavored the practitioners of the targeted religion 
and favored practitioners of more dominant religions, for rea-
sons that have no basis in the legitimate sources of secular author-
ity. 79 
77. Most famously, the Court's decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 
(1987), which struck down a Louisiana law that required the teaching of "creation sci-
ence," rested entirely on an assessment of legislative motive. More generally, the Lemon 
test, traditionally used to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges, seeks to identify leg-
islative intent. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The literature on legislative mo-
tive is voluminous, but nothing surpasses Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach 
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95. We should 
perhaps stress, however, that the fact that illicit motive is sufficient to constitute an Es-
tablishment Clause violation does not mean that it is necessary, and a state can violate 
the Clause in other manners. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that establishment clause is violated when state action 
causes a reasonable observer to feel like an outsider). 
78. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
79. The law challenged in City of Hialeah exemplifies a law that targets in this fash-
ion. 
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When the Court struck down the City of Hialeah's prohibi-
tion on the Santeria sect's practice of animal sacrifice,80 it did not 
rest its decision on establishment clause grounds,81 but it could 
have. The Court recognized that the City's action was intended 
to target-and succeeded in targeting-the practice of an identi-
fiable religious group; and that the city had no legitimate interest 
in prohibiting the practice other than its naked disagreement 
with that form of religious expression. Precisely the same conclu-
sions pertain to the prohibition against polygamy. 
Laws violate the establishment clause when they prefer re-
ligion in general to nonreligion, or when they prefer certain re-
ligions over others.82 The first dimension of the neutrality princi-
ple is more controversial than the second, but it is by now well-
established. Although advocates of the so-called nonpreferen-
tialist position have argued in recent years that the establishment 
clause does not prevent the government from preferring religion 
generally to nonreligion,83 the nonpreferentialist view is unten-
able as an historical matter and unsound as a doctrinal proposi-
tion. 84 The government cannot prefer a father who wants to have 
a day off on Sunday so that he can go to church with his children 
over a mother who wants to have a day off on Sunday so that she 
can walk with her children in the woods. 
This dimension of the neutrality principle is reflected in 
decades of establishment clause jurisprudence.85 It is ultimately 
rooted, of course, in Madison's notion that the government can-
not provide benefits to the religious at the expense of the nonre-
ligious (or the differently religious). Following Madison, the 
Court has held (for example) that, if the government is to pro-
vide a conscientious objector exception to conscription, it must 
be available to all who have a philosophical objection to warfare, 
not simply to those who have a religious objection.86 Similarly, 
the Court has held that laws that give religious employees cer-
tain rights vis-a-vis their employers must also extend to nonreli-
80. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
81. /d. at 532 (noting that establishment clause forbids official disapproval of are-
ligion, but purporting to rest decision on free exercise grounds). 
82. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 
702 (1994); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,56 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 
106-107 (1968). 
83. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
84. Laycock, supra note 22, at 875. 
85. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,612-16 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). 
86. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
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gious workers who have coherent, albeit nonreligious, bases for 
their conduct.87 
It should go without saying that the requirement of neutral-
ity between religion and nonreligion does not require that the 
state be morally agnostic. The state is entitled to embrace, and to 
legislate on the basis of, moral norms.88 Indeed, in certain re-
spects it makes sense to think of a state as a collection of certain 
norms.89 Those very norms can certainly underlie anything the 
state does-and may even do so as an ontological matter. The 
point, for establishment clause purposes, is that those norms 
must rest on a secular, moral bedrock-that is, they must rest on 
a moral structure independent of any particular creed and in-
deed of religion in general.90 
Such an independent moral bedrock is simple to identify, 
for it includes the raison d'etre of the modern state: the protec-
tion of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry. Thus, for 
example, laws that prohibit the use of narcotics, while perhaps 
ill-advised and at variance with certain values of libertarianism, 
are well within this bedrock. Similarly, laws that compel parents 
to provide for the welfare of their children, including laws that 
require that parents seek medical attention for their seriously ill 
children, are within this moral bedrock. Laws that forbid sexual 
relations between men and underage girls (or between women 
and underage boys) are within the state's power to prevent vul-
nerable citizens from having their wills overborne. 
Each of these examples of state action is a permissible exer-
cise of legislative power notwithstanding the fact that the legisla-
tion may intrude on the sincerely held beliefs of certain religious 
citizens. For the state's rationale for acting is not to single out a 
religious practice, but instead to further a secular objective. 
Where the state prohibits (or compels) conduct, it must have a 
secular basis for doing so; if it lacks a secular basis, the reason-
able inference is that it is seeking to undermine a religious prac-
tice. 
87. E.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
88. However, as we discuss in the following section, there are constitutional con-
straints on precisely which norms can form the basis of state action. 
89. On this point, we have profited greatly from reading many so-called social prac-
tice theorists, including particularly TUNICK, supra note 69. 
90. This point is discussed in greater detail in Dow, supra note 68. 
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C. LOCATING THE BEDROCK: WHICH MORAL 
VALUES CAN THE STATE IMPOSE? 
595 
Our thesis is that laws prohibiting polygamy are unconstitu-
tional, because they seek to codify a religiously rooted norm. 
The corollary of this thesis is that laws that seek to codify a norm 
that is rooted in the secular culture are permissible under the es-
tablishment clause. Under this approach to the establishment 
clause, it is necessary to ascertain where the roots of a moral 
prescription lie; we must be able to tell whether a given norm is 
limited to a discrete religious culture (or group of religious cul-
tures), or whether instead it is present in the culture's secular 
bedrock. 
There are two coherent conceptual approaches to resolving 
this issue. One, which we denominate the strong form of our the-
sis, has the virtue of greater conceptual coherence, but the dis-
advantage of being somewhat implausible as a doctrinal matter 
(at least in the near term). The second approach, which we refer 
to as the weak form of the thesis, has the virtue of being per-
fectly consistent with existing doctrine, but the disadvantage of 
greater epistemic complexity. 
We discuss these two approaches in turn 
1. The Strong Form 
The strong form holds that all naked moral legislation is im-
permissible under the establishment clause.91 If the prohibition 
against polygamy qualifies as a naked moral enactment, it would 
therefore be unconstitutional. 
Central to the argument that the establishment clause for-
bids naked moral legislation is an appreciation of the perceived 
interconnectedness between religion and morality in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (and earlier). Religion 
and religious ideology and culture were understood at the time 
of the framing of the Constitution, and are largely understood 
today, as systems that combine ritual with belief. Some of these 
beliefs have no moral content, but many do. As de Tocqueville, 
the greatest observer of nineteenth century America trenchantly 
put it, "the great severity of mores which ,:me notices in the 
United States has its primary origin in [religious] beliefs.',n Re-
91. The term is explicated below in this section. 
92. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
1969). 
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ligion, which is to say Christianity, was viewed as interconnected 
with the values underlying the republican form of government 
and America's democratic values. Again de Tocqueville: "I do 
not know if all Americans have faith in their religion- for who 
can read the secrets of the heart?- but I am sure that they think 
it is necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions. "93 
Tocqueville was wrong about many things,94 but not about 
the relationship in the early republic between religion and value. 
The country was religiously homogeneous, which meant that 
there was no conflict between the two domains. Beliefs held bls 
Americans as Christians were held by legislators as Americans. 5 
The relationship between religious virtue and political virtue 
was, if not embraced by American political thinkers, at least not 
forthrightly attacked (with the defining exception, of course, of 
Tom Paine). The beliefs associated with any religion are not 
necessarily limited to moral propositions;96 nevertheless, there is 
no system known as a religion that does not include some moral 
propositions. 97 
There is a sense, therefore, in which many Americans in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and many today, regard re-
ligion as the source of morality. This view is clearly unsound as a 
matter of intellectual history- utopian and godless communities 
have had fully developed moral frameworks-but the persis-
tence of this viewpoint is illuminating because it suggests that 
one purpose of the establishment clause is to prevent the imposi-
tion not simply of the ritualistic behavior associated with a cer-
tain religion, but also to prevent the codification of a moral code 
93. /d. at 293. See generally id. at 294-300. 
94. For example, de Tocqueville says, "America has had only a very small number 
of noteworthy writers, ... [and t)he spirit of the Americans is averse to general ideas." 
/d. at 301. De Tocqueville's first volume was published in 1835; the second in 1840. It is 
hard to conceive how someone could both admire the Constitution and simultaneously 
perceive an aversion to general ideas. 
With respect to his literary taste, as de Tocqueville was going into print the following 
American authors, to name just a few, were entering or were at their literary primes: 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (b. 1803), Walt Whitman (b. 1819), Nathaniel Hawthorne (b. 
1804), Herman Melville (b. 1819), Edgar Allan Poe (b. 1809), Henry David Thoreau (b. 
1817), Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (b. 1807), Sarah Grimke (b. 1792), Angelina 
Grimke (b. 1805), and others. 
95. An instructive discussion of this issue in the context of the ideology of the Prot-
estant Reformation can be found in AHLSTROM, supra note 24, at 81-83,425-27. 
96. The belief that Jesus is the son of God, or that God spoke to Moses from a 
burning bush, or that Allah or the Buddha went on a certain journey do not involve a 
moral proposition. 
97. See, e.g., JACK MILES, Goo: A BIOGRAPHY 110-11 (1995) (noting the origin of 
Hebrew Bible's God's interest in ethics); id. at 123. 
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associated with a particular religion. Jefferson's defense of reli-
gious liberty, for example, was inseparable from his view that the 
government could not interfere with freedom of the mind, and 
he expected that the separation between church and state would 
necessarily entail greater social tolerance.98 
To the extent, however, that moral codes are part of the on-
tology of any known religion,99 then it is sensible to view the es-
tablishment clause as preventing the enactment of any purely 
moral laws. A purely moral law we can define as a law that seeks 
to control the behavior or activity of a moral agent, without 
there being any connection between the behavior of that agent 
and any consequence to anyone other than that agent. 100 Such a 
law reflects a naked moral preference.101 In the criminal law lit-
erature, this concept is referred to as "victimless crimes." 
Whether a given crime is in fact victimless is obviously an em-
pirical question. But, unless one accepts that internal angst 
caused by what others are doing is the sort of harm that the state 
is permitted to remediate, then the category of victimless crimes 
is clearly sound. (By "internal angst," I have in mind Mencken's 
quip that a Puritan is deathly afraid that someone somewhere is 
having a good time.) 
A law, for example, that prohibited masturbation or fasting 
would violate the establishment clause, under this approach, be-
cause such a law would express a naked moral preference (that 
masturbation or fasting is bad), without linking that preference 
to the prevention of harm or injury to someone else. Naked 
98. Dozens of sources could be cited here. See, e.g., DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON 
AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 106-11 (1951); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX 283-84 
(1997). For suggestions that the Constitution embodies precisely this value, see, for ex-
ample, DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 103-162 (1986). 
99. We have profited greatly on understanding the relationship between ritual and 
preservation of any religion's beliefs from RAPPAPORT, supra note 69; on the point in the 
text, see id. at 124-138. 
100. As Brian Bix pointed out to us, there may be a salient distinction between laws 
that seek to prevent physical injury to an actor and laws that seek to avoid injury to an 
actor's moral character or "soul." Mandatory seatbelt and helmet laws, drug laws, and 
perhaps restrictions on prostitution would fall into the former category. It is also possi-
ble, however, that the distinction between these two classes of harm is less a function of 
the nature of the harm to the individual than it is a function of the costs borne by the 
state. Thus, the state itself may have an economic interest in preventing some harms but 
not others; the economic interest will tend to be present in cases of physical harm. 
101. The term is of course borrowed from Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the 
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). Sunstein uses the phrase to refer to the 
distribution of resources to a limited group, rather than across the social spectrum, 
merely because of the favored group's political power. Our use of the term is similar: the 
politically dominant group seeks to codify its moral inclinations, even where the behav-
iors it deems immoral do not cause injury to nonconsenting individuals. 
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moral preferences interfere with the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment precisely because they exemplify a 
form of establishment. 
This approach to the establishment clause is not inconsistent 
with establishment clause case law so much as it is in tension 
with language in many cases suggesting the existence of state 
power to regulate morality per se. For example, in a multitude of 
obscenity cases, the Court has recited the platitude that the state 
can regulate morals. 102 1t merits emphasis, however, that with the 
possible exception of the sodomy10 and assisted suicide cases,104 
so-called moral legislation that is implicated in cases that have 
reached the Supreme Court always aims at preventing a harm to 
someone other than a volitional participant in assertedly im-
moral behavior. 105 Thus, laws prohibiting prostitution and drug 
use, as well as laws regulating obscenity, all seek to address a 
harm that the legislature believes befalls innocent members of 
society. Prostitution and obscenity, for example, coerce women 
or children, and may lead to disease or economic ruination of 
neighborhoods. Drug use creates social medical costs and leads 
to secondary criminal activity. Whether these beliefs concerning 
the consequences of these activities are sound, or whether they 
are pretextual, is an issue that, for the moment, is besides the 
point. What is important is that the legislature itself recognizes 
that a naked moral preference is not a permissible subject of leg-
islation.106 
A number of leading academicians have embraced what we 
refer to as the strong form of the thesis, and have argued for it in 
both fteneral terms and in the context of specific legal proscrip-
tions. 07 We are subscribers to this strong view, and under it, laws 
102. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (noting that 
public indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order and that the 
traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public 
health, safety, and morals). 
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
104. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997). 
105. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. See generally Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the 
Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Gov-
ernment Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139 (1998). 
106. The distinction between a naked moral preference and a moral preference that 
aims at protecting innocent members of society is salient in the Court's welfare cases. 
Compare Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) 
(striking down regulations that aimed at or had the effect of penalizing nonmarital co-
habitation) with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a cap on welfare 
benefits that aimed to provide incentives for family planning). 
107. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 
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prohibiting polygamy cannot survive establishment clause scru-
tiny, because they express a naked moral preference for a tradi-
tional form of marital relationship.108 They are no more defensi-
ble than would be a law that compelled women to be subservient 
to their husbands, or that prevented racial intermarriage. In our 
view, however, even if one is disinclined to embrace the strong 
view, the same conclusion holds, because the weaker form as 
well undermines laws prohibiting polygamy. In the following sec-
tion we therefore turn to the weaker form. 
2. The Weaker Form 
The virtue of the weaker form of the argument is that it as-
sumes that naked morals legislation is permissible, thereby 
avoiding the difficult doctrinal matter that is associated with 
proving the contrary. However, even one who is inclined to cling 
tenaciously to the view that the state has the power to legislate 
on the basis of naked moral preferences would be compelled to 
acknowledge that not all naked moral preferences are permissi-
ble bases for legislation. The state could not require individuals 
to rest on the Sabbath. The state could not force individuals to 
tithe, or to avoid sexual intercourse when women are menstruat-
ing, or to eschew contraception. The reason is not that these laws 
reflect no moral component. Quite the contrary is the case: they 
are emphatically moral. Rather, the reason the state cannot re-
quire conduct in accordance with these moral propositions is 
that they are not rooted in the broader cultural bedrock; instead, 
they are rooted in a discrete religious culture. 
Yet many moral propositions are present in a wide array of 
cultures, while other moral propositions may begin in one cul-
ture and then move to others. The command to observe the Sab-
bath began in ancient Judaism, but is also present in Christianity 
and Islam. Proscriptions against nonjustifiable homicide are pre-
IND. L.J. 331 (1995); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997) (arguing that laws prohibiting 
homosexual activity are unconstitutional because they embody a purely religious prefer-
ence). Justice Stevens articulated a closely related argument in his dissent in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560,566-68 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that portions of the challenged law reflected tenets of Christian faith but lacked 
secular purpose). 
108. Mary Anne Case has argued in private conversation that there is an administra-
tive (which is to say economic) basis for such laws. Perhaps, but it seems more probable 
that this ostensible economic justification is in fact pretextual, particularly inasmuch as 
the origin of these laws appears to have nothing to do with economics or administrative 
efficiency. 
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sent in every known human culture.109 Consequently, if the es-
tablishment clause prevents the state from codifying only those 
moral values that are not present in the secular cultural bedrock, 
the critical question is how one determines where a norm is 
rooted. 
The inquiry that must be made to answer this question is 
more art than science. It is not, however, an inquiry that is 
unique to our conception of the establishment clause. Rather, it 
is precisely the inquiry that the Court makes in the due process 
context in determining whether an asserted right is within the 
meaning of the word liberty. Hegel had an idea of "objective 
ethical order," and the role of the judge in the context of both 
the due process and establishment clauses is to apprehend that 
order. 110 
In the due process context, if a plaintiff asserts that a law in-
terferes with her right to do something, the first question is 
whether she in fact has such a protected right. For example, if a 
plaintiff argues that laws prohibiting the use of contraception in-
terfere with her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court begins by asking whether the right to use contraception is 
within the meaning of the word liberty. The various formulae 
used to resolve this issue are well known. Is the right asserted by 
the plaintiff within the meaning of ordered liberty? 111 Is the 
claimed right one that has traditionally been protected by soci-
ety? 112 Is the asserted right closely related to something that the 
Court has already recognized as within the meaning of the 
word? 113 The various iterations of this question have great prac-
tical significance; what all versions of the question have in com-
mon, however, is that they are historically oriented: The judge 
answers the question by examining what society has done over a 
given time. 
109. Cf. RAPPAPORT, supra note 69, at 132 (noting that homicide is sometimes re-
quired, which is true, but not inconsistent with the assertion in the text). Rappaport ar-
gues at a somewhat higher level of generality, insisting that every culture has a restriction 
against breaching obligation, which obligations are defined by that culture. 
110. Hegel is quoted in TUNICK, supra note 69, at 35. As Tunick explains, Hegel's 
idea here is that the culture's ethical principles are part of our individual identities. Hegel 
acknowledges that the ethical practices of a given legal culture form part of the identity 
of the members of that culture, but he also understands that ethical practices are subject 
to rational critique. /d. at 37. 
Ill. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). 
112. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.). 
113. /d. at 137-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's approach to this issue has 
been, I think, fatally criticized by Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Gen-
erality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). 
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Replicating this inquiry in a slightly different context is how 
it is possible to determine the source of a given moral value. 114 
Whereas, in the due process context, the court asks whether a 
given iteration of a right is inherent in the idea of ordered liberty 
or "deeply rooted" in the nation's traditions and values, it would 
ask, in the establishment clause context, whether a given moral 
value has historically been the subject of secular legislation or 
whether, on the contrary, it has been limited to sectarian do-
mains. As is the case in the due process context, there will be 
disputes as to the appropriate level of generality at which the 
question should be articulated in the establishment clause con-
text. Moreover, just as it is true that articulating the question at a 
higher level of generality in the due process context will tend to 
favor the individual (vis-a-vis the state), articulating the question 
at a high level of generality in the establishment clause context 
will tend to favor the state. 
Whether one is inclined to ask the relevant question at a 
high or a low level of generality is partly an aesthetic matter and 
partly related to one's view of what a constitution is. Neverthe-
less, three general observations su~~est that a relatively low level 
of generality is more appropriate. 5 First, it is a mistake in the 
establishment clause area to ask questions at a relatively high 
level of generality, because at a high level of generality, the role 
of both the secular state and religious institutions is the same: 
namely, to provide for the welfare of their members. Accord-
ingly, insofar as the Constitution presupposes that these institu-
tions are to occupy discrete domains, one must articulate the 
question at a low enough level of generality to account for the 
conceptual (and constitutional) distinction between these human 
institutions. Second, although both the secular state and religious 
institutions have conventions, the concept of ritual and of liturgy 
are present only in the religious domain. All societies have con-
ventions but only religious institutions have liturgy or rituals. 
Any practice, therefore, that is intertwined with ritual or liturgy 
is a practice the roots of which are limited to the religious 
sphere. Finally, rituals and liturgy aim to protect the institution 
of which they are part from dissolution or entropy. The secular 
114. There is a well-developed strand of the philosophical literature that looks to 
social practice to reach conclusions concerning ethical requirements. Hundreds of cita-
tions could be offered, but for a sample, see TUNICK, supra note 69; MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 
(1977); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, 
POETIC JUSTICE (1995). 
115. This paragraph draws on RAPPAPORT, supra note 69, at 127-93. 
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state, however, does not merit preservation as an end in itself; its 
preservation is justified only as long as it is preserving the wel-
fare of its citizens. 
With these considerations in mind, we can turn to the con-
crete issue of polygamy and ask whether the prohibition against 
it has an historical secular basis. As indicated above, the choice 
of level of generality can prove dispositive. Thus, if we ask 
whether there is a deeply rooted tradition whereby the state 
regulates marriage, the answer would of course be yes. 116 How-
ever, if we were to ask more specific questions, such as whether 
the state has traditionally regulated whom one may marry, the 
answer would be negative. 117 Indeed, if we were to have asked at 
the time Congress first prohibited polygamy whether there was a 
secular tradition of regulating marriage by controlling the num-
ber of spouses one could have, the answer would be no. 118 
116. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital 
Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) ("The legal regulation of mar-
riage is usually uncontroversial and given little attention within family law."); see also 
Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L. Q. 255,256-63 (2002) 
(cataloguing state regulations). 
117. See, e.g., Bix, Choice of Law, supra note 116, at 257 & nn.3, 4 (noting that state 
law typically does not require that both prospective spouses have a connection to the 
state where the marriage will be performed and effected). Tne state has traditionally 
prohibited incestuous relationships. To the extent there is a medical or anti-coercion ba-
sis for these restrictions, then they are supported by an independent secular rationale. 
However, it is also possible that they too reflect a naked moral preference, in which case 
they are constitutionally suspect. The lack of consistency concerning the meaning of in-
cest tends to suggest the thinness of any legitimate secular interest. See Martha Mahoney, 
A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 
21 (1993); Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" Is Harmless Incest: Determining the 
Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State In-
cest Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 262,263-65 (2000). 
Of course, it is also important to mention that there is in fact some history in Amer-
ica of regulating who may marry whom, and that history is shameful. I have in mind, of 
course, anti-miscegenation laws-themselves defended on religious grounds-which 
were not struck down until the second half of the twentieth century. See Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Virginia trial judge who presided over the criminal trial of 
the parties took the position that "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, 
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference 
with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he sepa-
rated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." !d. at 3. 
118. Althvugh at the time of the framing secular prohibitions on bigamy or polyg-
amy existed, these laws reflect the perceived biblical prohibition on multiple wives. In-
terestingly, however, neither the Hebrew Bible nor the New Testament, the norms of 
which the Mormons were said to have offended with their practice of polygamy, prohibits 
polygamy. Not until the eleventh century was polygamy prohibited among Ashkenazic 
Jews, and Sephardic Jewry did not prohibit polygamy until much later. The New Testa-
ment's statement "husband of one wife" (I Timothy 3:2) can be read as a prohibition on 
polygamy, yet through the time of the Reformation poly~~y was not uncommon in 
Christianity. Nevertheless, in the contemporary Judeo-Chnstlan world, the ban on po-
lygamy is identified as a religious command. As the Court observed in Reynolds, the 
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History does not answer questions directly. Even so, it 
seems fairly clear as an historical matter that the regulation of 
whom one may marry is an issue that has been quintessentially 
within the domain of religious authority. 119 An institution that 
includes rituals that are needed to preserve the institution from 
decay must perforce be concerned with the identity of the parties 
to a marital relationship. The very concept of intermarriage re-
flects the extent to which restrictions on marriage are rooted in 
discrete religious cultures. Religious rules establish who may 
marry within that church, what the conditions of that marriage 
will be, and whether and under what circumstances divorce will 
be permissible. The point of these restrictions is to control and 
define the family unit per se, and the point of defining the family 
unit is to preserve the religious institution itself. 
The state, however, has no inde~endent interest in defining 
this unit, or even in preserving itself. 1 0 Unless the state can iden-
tify a harm that is traditionally within the province of the state to 
eradicate, then laws controlling the marital relationship are im-
permissible. It is therefore to that issue that we now turn. 
C. POLYGAMY AND AUTHORITY 
The City of Hialeah was not permitted to prohibit animal 
sacrifice because an examination of what the city was doing and 
why the city was doing it revealed that there was no legitimate 
state interest in the prohibition. Accordingly, the prohibition was 
revealed as an impermissible targeting of a religious practice. 
The key questions, therefore, for purposes of examining the 
English prohibition was enforced by the ecclesiastical courts, for marriage and its rudi· 
ments had (and has) a sacramental dimension. Teasing apart the secular injunction from 
the ostensible religious command is beyond the scope of this essay, and beyond my ex· 
pertise. Suffice it to say that the prohibition is identified as a religious (or quasireligious) 
command. In contrast, in the non-industrialized, non-Judea-Christian world, polygamy is 
the accepted norm. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 69 (1992). 
119. There has also been something of a nationalistic element to these laws. For ex-
ample, British prohibitions on polygamy, and the refusal to recognize the legality of po-
lygamous relationships, emerged as immigrants who practiced polygamy entered the 
country in significant numbers. See Prakash Shah, Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law, 
52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 369-400 (2002) available at http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/ 
pages/papers.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2003). Professor Shah argues that in denying the 
validity of polygamous marriages, English courts "upheld a self-consciously Christian 
viewpoint." !d. at 374 & n.l8. 
120. See supra note 106 (discussing attempts to use welfare laws to control cohabita-
tion); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978) (noting that the right to marry is fundamental but 
declining to conclude that any restriction on marital freedom is therefore subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
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state's prohibition of polygamous unions are: What is the inde-
pendent secular basis for prohibiting such unions, and is that ba-
sis sound? 
There are three conceivable justifications for such a prohibi-
tion:121 to prevent betrothal of minors, to protect women from 
entering into relationships of dramatically unequal power, and to 
protect the children, both emotionally and economically. As the 
data reveal, however, none of these justifications is empirically 
or conceptually sound. 122 
At the outset, however, a word should be added about the 
attractiveness of these rationale, as well as the breadth of power 
they would support. The state assuredly has a compelling inter-
est in preventing minors, generally, from committing themselves 
to marriage; and the state has a perhaps more weighty interest in 
protecting children from emotional and financial hardship. But 
the former interest is easily achieved without prohibiting polyg-
amy, and the latter interest is not uniquely implicated in the con-
text of polygamy. 
We can begin with the issue of minor children being coerced 
in certain sects to enter marriage. This phenomenon undoubt-
edly occurs,123 and it occurs in both the polygamous and mo-
nogamous marital contexts. There are no reported studies and 
no reliable data that suggest that minor children are coerced into 
marriage in a polygamous society in any greater numbers than 
they are in monogamous cultures.124 
121. I do not consider the ostensible administrative basis for these laws, because it 
strikes me as pretextual. See supra note 108. 
122. The most thorough study of polygamous households found, among other things, 
that (i) the man's various wives established harmonious relationships among themselves, 
(ii) the relationship between children and father was not significantly different from the 
father-child relationship in nonpolygamous households, (iii) the children established rela-
tionships both with their own mothers and their father's other wives, and (iv) women en-
tered these relationships not because they felt coerced but because of their religious in-
clinations. See JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES (1987). 
123. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Polygamist's Custody Fight Raises Many Issues, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A14. 
124. For insightful discussions of arranged marriage, see, for example, Margaret F. 
Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 733, 752-61 (2001); Mar-
garet F. Brinig, In Search of Prince Charming, 4 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 321, 331-36 
(2001); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The "Sealed Knot": A Preliminary Bibliography .of 
"Covenant Marriage," 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 145 (1999-2000). For comprehensive dis-
cussions of the variety of cohabitative forms, see, for example, David D. Meyer, Self-
Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L. REV. 791(2002); Carol 
Weisbrod, Universals and Particulars: A Comment of Women's Human Rights and Reli-
gious Marriage Contracts, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 77 (1999). 
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Moreover, the solution to underage marriages is enforce-
ment of existing laws prohibiting men and women below a cer-
tain age from marrying. This is the solution employed by nearly 
every state. 125 Further, to the extent there is a concern that these 
laws are ineffective because they proscribe marriage but are cir-
cumvented by nonmartial cohabitation, the obvious solution is to 
prohibit cohabitation as well. 
In other words, and in sum, the state's interest in preventing 
coercion of minors is far better served by means other than the 
prohibition against polygamy. Before turning to the state's more 
general interest in protecting children from economic and emo-
tional hardship, we can quickly dispense with the asserted inter-
est in preventing women from entering relationships of dramati-
cally disparate power. In the commercial context, the state surely 
has the power to prohibit certain relationships in view of the un-
equal bargaining power of the parties. 126 But in the domain of 
human (as distinguished from commercial) relationships, the 
state's power is necessarily far more constrained. What strikes 
some people as an abhorrent domestic relationship is, for others, 
marital bliss. It seems likely that there are women who enter po-
lygamous marriages simply because their own mothers did, but it 
seems just as likely that women enter what might be referred to 
as sexist marriages inside the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim tra-
ditions as well. Orthodox Jews, for example, permit the man to 
divorce his wife but require that the man assent if the woman 
seeks to divorce. A similar imbalance inheres in traditional Mus-
lim marriage, and the Southern Baptist movement recently reaf-
firmed that the wife's role is to be subservient to her husband. 
More generally, the problem of children doing what their par-
ents do, and thereby being deprived of information concerning 
alternatives, is in part a problem of the status of children as qua-
siproperty127 and in part a problem of religion generally.128 Po-
lygamy may well be offensive from the point of the view of ad-
125. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246-48 (2002) (noting that 
48 states permit those under the age of 17 to marry only with parental consent, and that 
in 39 states, the age for consent to sexual relationships is 16 or younger) (citations omit-
ted). 
126. For example, laws prohibiting voluntary servitude and prohibitions on uncon-
scionable contracts. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
127. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Propeny, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992). 
128. Justice Douglas's dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which up-
held on Free Exercise grounds the right of the Amish not to send their children to public 
school, emphasized precisely this point. /d. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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vacates of gender equality, but it is not uniquely offensive, and 
so its prohibition cannot reasonably be explained as an effort to 
eradicate sexual inequality. 
What remains to be discussed is the state's interest in pro-
tecting children from emotional and economic deprivation. 
Clearly the state has a compellinB interest in protecting children 
from these and other hardships. 1 But the mere existence of this 
interest does not automatically sustain anything that the state 
does under its aegis. The Court, for example, has struck down 
parental notification laws in the abortion context, despite the as-
sertion of a state interest in protecting the minors' emotional 
well-being. 130 The Court has recently struck down provisions of 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act, despite similar asser-
tions. 131 
The state may prefer that all children grow up in homes 
where there is no economic privation, but it is clear that a state 
cannot remove a child from a home simply because of poverty. 132 
Indeed, as a general matter, despite the state's compelling inter-
est in the welfare of children, the law recognizes that that wel-
fare is ordinarily best served by decisions made by the child's 
parents. 133 Accordingly, although a state has an interest in the 
welfare of the children, before it can interfere with the funda-
mental rights of the parents, the evidence establishing that inter-
est must be clear, and the link between the interest and the inter-
ference with the parents must be certain.134 
129. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. United States, 390 U.S. 629,636 (1968) ("The well·being of 
its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate."); 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (affirming that states have a legitimate inter-
est in the welfare of minors); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (asserting that states 
have a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of mi-
nors and in destroying the exploitation of children by punishing those who possess and 
view child pornography); cf James Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: De-
bunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1994) (arguing that 
any attempt by the state to improve the lives of children is restricted by parents' funda-
mental rights). 
130. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
131. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002); Reno v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
132. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). See generally Paul Anthony Wilhelm, 
Permanency at What Cost?, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 617, 636 
(2002). 
133. Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control 
Between Parent and State, U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (2000). 
134. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). 
See generally THEODORE J. STEIN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAW 26-27 (1991). 
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Applying these principles in the context of polygamy does 
the state no good, for there are no reliable, reported data sug-
gesting that children of polygamous families are uniquely and 
significantly disadvantaged from an economic or emotional 
standpoint. A recent examination of children in polygamous 
families in Muslim households in the Middle East indicated that 
although the academic achievement of children in polygamous 
households was lower than the achievement of children from 
monogamous homes, the educational achievement of the parents 
in polygamous households was also lower than the achievement 
of parents in monogamous homes, leading to the possible con-
clusion that it is the parents' achievement that is the critical fac-
tor.135 The same study indicates that the children's mental health 
is more significantly affected by socioeconomic status and paren-
tal educational achievement than by their parents' marital 
status.136 Indeed, the best predictor of mental health is family 
functioning-without regard to whether the family is monoga-
mous or polygamous (and the study found no link between fam-
ily functioning and polygamy or monogamy). 137 
In short, therefore, while some might advocate a role for the 
state in inquiring carefully into the conditions of households to 
determine whether children should be removed, such advocates 
would not be able to use polygamy as a reliable proxy for identi-
fying the conditions that would warrant removal of the child 
from the home. Dysfunctional households are not dispropor-
tionately polygamous households, and households suffering eco-
nomic privation are as often single-parent homes as they are 
multiple-parent homes. The ban on polygamy simply cannot be 
justified by the interests of the children. 
CONCLUSION 
Getting the right answer in constitutional law does not al-
ways require an understanding of history, but history is often 
useful, and occasionally indispensable. When the Supreme Court 
infamously upheld a Louisiana law requiring blacks and whites 
to ride in separate train cars, the majority held, formalistically, 
135. Alean AI-Krenawi, John R. Graham, & Vered Slonim-Nevo, Mental Health 
Aspects of Arab-Israeli Adolescents from Polygamous Versus Monogamous Families, 142 
1. Soc. PSYCH. 446 (2002). 
136. /d. 
137. /d. 
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that the law did not discriminate against blacks.138 1t took Justice 
Harlan's dissent to note the crucial historical point: that the law 
"had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white per-
sons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored 
people" from cars occupied by whites.139 1t would have been pos-
sible for the Court to have gotten the right answer even without 
Harlan's implicit understanding of the relevant history, but had 
the Court shared his understanding, it would have been impossi-
ble to get it wrong. 
Professor Gordon has now provided the meticulous history 
that illuminates the nation's laws prohibiting polygamy. It is pos-
sible, of course, that there has developed a secular basis for these 
laws, but if there is such a basis, it as yet remains undisclosed. 
The origin of the prohibition lay in the endorsement of a dis-
tinctly western, or Judea-Christian form of marriage. Professor 
Gordon's history reveals that the criminalization of polygamy 
and the divesting of polygamists of their civil rights lay simply in 
a religiously-rooted abhorrence of an unusual form of family. 
Irony begets irony. More than a century after the LDS 
church renounced polygamy once the federal government placed 
a gun to its head, that same church has become a leading an-
tagonist of efforts to recognize same-sex unions. 140 And this very 
effort suggests an answer as to why those who can usually be 
counted on to defend religious liberty have, in the domain of po-
lygamy, remained distinctly silent: because if polygamy is consti-
tutionally protected, then so too must be same-sex marriage-a 
proposition the Christian right refuses to endorse.141 
The outlines of this dynamic were revealed in the Court's 
opinion in Romer v. Evans, 142 which struck down a Colorado 
measure that purported to preclude gays from bringing equal 
protection challenges to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Justice Scalia's dissent characterized abhorrence of 
138. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
139. /d. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
140. See Robert J. Morris, What Though Our Rights Have Been Assailed, 18 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPT. 129 (1997). 
141. For an analysis of how polygamy and same-sex marriage were linked by propo-
nents of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act, see David L. Chambers, Polygamy and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1997). 
142. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The secondary literature on Romer is vast. Particularly 
worthwhile are Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 257 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Right-
ness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996); and Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, 
49 DUKE L.J. 1559 (2000). 
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polygamy as tantamount to hatred of murder and disdain for 
animal cruelty-and he suggested that hostility toward homo-
sexuality is similarly legitimate.143 In so arguing, Justice Scalia's 
approach asked simply whether a given view exists, without in-
quiring into its origin. It is a form of analysis that Justice Harlan 
rejected in his Plessy dissent, and a form of analysis that is in-
compatible with the core value of the establishment clause. That 
discrimination exists-that it has always existed and will always 
exist-hardly immunizes such prejudice from constitutional at-
tack. Yet, despite these shortcomings in Justice Scalia's method-
ology, his argument explains why no one is speaking up for 
Thomas Green: because to speak up for him is to speak up for 
others whose form of eccentricity defenders of religious liberty 
do not want to defend. 
Whatever the reason that no one seems willing to speak 
very loudly on behalf of polygamists, the fact remains that a po-
litically powerless and fringe group has had a defining character-
istic of its lifestyle prohibited for no good reason, other than that 
a political majority finds it inconsistent with the traditional 
Judea-Christian conception of marriage. There could hardly be a 
more egregious singling out of a religious practice, and there 
could therefore hardly be a more straightforward violation of the 
establishment clause. 
Discrimination against gays and lesbians-not discrimina-
tion against polygamists-is the civil rights issue of the modern 
generation. But that civil rights movement will not prevail until 
legal and political institutions acknowledge that liberty perishes 
when a moral orthodoxy grounded in the majority's traditional 
religion is imposed upon all by the state. 
143. Romer. 517 U.S. at 642-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
